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Contracts and Costs in a  
Corporate/Government System 
Dynamics Network:  
A United States Case 
F. Gregory Hayden and Steven R. Bolduc 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Social scientists have come to understand that society is a set of integrated values, beliefs, institutions, technology, and eco-
logical systems as explicitly laid out in Figure 1 (Hayden 1988, 
1997). Societal integration and organization takes place through 
the on—going processing of overlapping institutions and their 
organizations. The components of transorganizational frame-
works, as demonstrated in Figure 1, create and structure the net-
works within which organizations such as business corporations 
and government agencies function. “Trans” as used in this sense 
means across. Across organizational networks normative crite-
ria are provided by social beliefs, technology, and ecological sys-
tems (Hayden, 1998). From basic criteria, numerous rules, reg-
ulations, and requirements are codified by various institutional 
organizations such as courts, corporations, and government agen-
cies. Transorganizational frameworks guide multi-organization 
networks made up of overlapping organizations. Thurman Ar-
nold explained in his Folklore of Capitalism that modern industrial 
systems are the integration of huge organizations that are coor-
dinated with different kinds of organizations. Corporations, gov-
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ernment agencies, universities, and inter-organizational compacts, 
for example, function together and are dependent upon each other 
(Arnold, 1937). They are one of another. 
Much of the coordination and planning among the different or-
ganizations is finalized through multi-organizational contracts 
and agreements. Thus, analysis to meet the challenges of indus-
trial policy needs to incorporate the inter-organizational forms 
whose content, interpretation, and final function are determined 
by the actions taken in dynamic transorganizational networks. For 
such an accomplishment, the analytical methodology needs to be 
transdisciplinary as is implicit in Figure 1. 
The purpose here is methodological, substantive, and policy-
oriented. The purpose is to analyze the ramifications of a cost-plus 
contract arrangement that is very influential in determining the 
costs and activities of a particular corporate/government network 
in the United States. The network is built around the five-state 
Central Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact (CIC) to include 
its policy-making Commission, a number of corporations, and sev-
eral government agencies. The main methodological concern is 
how to model a transorganizational network utilizing the knowl-
edge of transdisciplinary models. To accomplish this, the social 
fabric matrix (Hayden, 1982; Groenewegen, 1988; Meister, 1990) is 
combined with system dynamics (Radzicki, 1990; Gill, 1996). 
Both the social fabric matrix and system dynamics proce-
dures share a similar foundation. Institutional economics is 
oriented to the development of understandings about sys-
tem cause and effect or influence patterns. The basic notion 
is that system management can only proceed upon a sound 
understanding of this underlying causation. The social fab-
ric matrix is a systematic procedure for identifying and de-
veloping system insights. It is in effect, an institutional pat-
tern modeling procedure. It may also serve as a structured 
process to facilitate the active participation of system play-
ers in policy development. System dynamics is another 
kind of pattern modeling, usually orientated to the quan-
titative representation of systems for simulation analysis. 
Qualitative relationships identified through the social fab-
ric matrix process can be translated into a system dynam-
ics model formulation. As a two- part procedure, a prelimi-
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nary social fabric matrix is applied to explore systematically 
the insights of system players and represent them in an en-
tirely qualitative construct. These insights, when translated 
into a formal system dynamics model, can be manipulated 
to address the concerns, expectations and ideas of system 
players and lead toward the development of management 
strategies and policies with which they have some empathy 
(Gill, 1996, pp. 179—180). 
Figure 1. Relationships among values, beliefs, attitudes, technology and the 
ecological system 
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The substantive interest is to understand both the network and 
the monetary costs during the future operational phase of the CIC 
facility (abbreviations listed at end for the readers’ convenience). 
After a general overview of the system, the analysis is divided be-
tween the pre- operational phase and operational phase of the proj-
ect. Coinciding with the last two years of the pre-operational phase 
is the construction phase. The latter will be explained with the oper-
ational phase cost because that is when construction costs are paid. 
In the first section below a standard social fabric matrix (SFM) 
and digraph are utilized to explain the general context of this case 
study. The next section is an analysis of the pre-operational phase 
in which the SFM and digraph are used to demonstrate how to an-
alyze the provisions of a cost-plus contract in order to, first, arrive 
at algebraic formulae of the contracts and, second, arrive at the to-
tal costs to be carried forward into the operational phase. The last 
section of analysis devoted to the projection of operational costs of 
the CIC facility. This is accomplished by utilizing the system dy-
namics program, ithink®. The program serves as a vehicle for de-
fining the digraph, and associated SFM, and for projecting an inte-
grated set of operational costs. 
Roderic Gill has explained that the SFM is to be constructed 
through a process of consultations and interactions with real-
world system agents and documents (Gill, 1996, p. 173). The anal-
ysis here is based on a great deal of personal experience by the au-
thors with the actors and institutions of the network. In addition, 
numerous primary documents have been consulted. They include 
the main contracts and agreements, the invoices and accounting 
systems, meeting minutes, the legal opinions and court decisions, 
legislative bills, considerable correspondence, the US Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K reports of the primary corpora-
tions, and the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), the name given to a 
multiple volume application submitted for a license to build and 
operate the CIC radioactive waste facility. 
Too often, public-policy literature about transorganizations 
coveys the idea that overlapping organizations are collaborative 
and cooperative endeavors devoid of animosity. That is mislead-
ing with regard to the real world and is not necessary for model-
ing. In addition, such an assumption is inconsistent with the CIC 
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case whose record is one of civil and political turmoil, a continu-
ous parade of lawsuits, expensive overruns, renegotiations and re-
formulations of contracts, an imprisoned CIC executive director, 
instances of raw intimidation, exploitative interest expenses on 
loans, and heavy social and personal burdens on various groups. 
Contextual Description of the CIC Network 
Because the corporate/government case of interest revolves 
around the Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Com-
pact (the CIC), a brief history is reviewed before a general over-
view of the network is presented. 
History of Low-Level Waste Compact System 
In 1980, the US Congress passed legislation for states to create 
a regional decentralized system of compacts for the disposal of 
low-level radioactive waste. Several basic premises upon which 
compact legislation were based have proven incorrect. First, con-
trary to expectations, the stream of low-level radioactive waste 
generated has continued to decrease since 1980 and is projected 
to continue to decline. Second, due to the particular characteris-
tics of the externalities associated with federal compacts, they are 
not structured to be successful for the given objective (Hayden 
and Bolduc, 1997). Third, the compacts among the states are not 
regional. For example, California, the most southwestern state 
bordering the Pacific Ocean, is in a compact with South Dakota 
and North Dakota, the most northern state bordering Canada. 
Texas, the most southern state bordering Mexico, is in a compact 
with Vermont and Maine, the most northeastern state border-
ing Canada and the Atlantic Ocean. Consequently, the argument 
that a regional structure of compacts would minimize the num-
ber of miles that waste would need to be transported can not be 
realized. 
When little progress was made toward establishing compact 
relationships and disposal sites. Congress, passed the Low Level 
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Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985. That act generally provided 
states with a timetable and milestone penalties to encourage each 
state to either construct its own low—level waste storage facility 
or form a compact with other states. This was followed by a period 
of lawsuits in which different states challenged, in some cases suc-
cessfully, different parts of the federal legislation. After that, in-
ternal conflicts within certain compacts led to the resignation or 
removal of some states. To date, new construction has not been 
undertaken by any compact. 
The CIC is a compact made up of an agreement among the 
states of Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Nebraska. 
The site selected for the disposal facility is near the northern bor-
der of Nebraska, a central state located north of the geographi-
cal center of the United States. Louisiana is one of the most south-
ern states, bordering the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana generates more 
low-level radioactive waste than any of the other Compact states; 
therefore, the site location will maximize transportation of such 
waste for disposal in the CIC area. In addition to the U.S. Congress 
and state governments, the CIC industrial system includes federal, 
state, and local government agencies, some of the world’s largest 
and several of the United States’ smallest corporations, and the 
electric generators from the five states. 
Social Fabric Matrix Description 
To begin to obtain an understanding of the whole system, the 
CIC, related agencies and organizations, and their relevant con-
nections are articulated in the social fabric matrix (SFM) in Fig-
ure 2. Across the left side and top of the SFM are the social cri-
teria and institutional components, which inform the network 
digraph that is uniquely associated with the SFM. Researchers 
utilize the SFM from left to right, so to speak, in order to discover 
what the row components are delivering to the columnar com-
ponents in each cell. For cells where there is a delivery, or de-
liveries, a 1 is entered. The SFM network digraph for Figure 2 
is found in Figure 3 with relevant cell deliveries on the directed 
edges among components. 
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Figures 2 and 3 are jointly utilized to provide an overview of 
the general network for this corporate/government case study. 
They emphasize the pre-operational phase of the development 
process with only one entry serving as the subsequent opera-
tional phase. A more refined elaboration on both phases will be 
presented later. The institutional component that created the com-
pact system is the US Congress. To make it function, Congress di-
rectly delivered rules, regulations, authority, and responsibilities 
to federal government agencies and to the five CIC states. Primary 
responsibility was placed on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion with concurrent jurisdiction and responsibility residing with 
the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Department of 
Energy, and the US Department of Interior. These federal agen-
cies, in turn, promulgate rules, regulations, requests, and inspec-
Figure 2. General social fabric matrix of CIC system 
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Figure 3. General social fabric digraph network of CIC system.
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tions that are delivered to the CIC states [cell (2,4)]; to Nebraska 
state agencies [cell (2,5)]; to the CIC [cell (2,8)]; and to American 
Ecology Corporation (AEC) [cell (2,13)]. Similar deliveries will be 
made to the same institutional agencies and organizations during 
the operational phase of the facility. 
The five state governments provide a small percentage of the 
funds necessary for the administration of the CIC [cells (3,8) and 
(4,8)]. The four states without the site provide $75,000 annually to 
the CIC with the resulting $300,000 delivered to Boyd County Com-
munities [cell (8,7)]. Boyd County, Nebraska is the proposed site for 
construction of the low- level radioactive waste disposal facility. 
The most powerful organizations in the network are the ma-
jor generators that own the nuclear power plants in the five states; 
the most important institutional document is the “Agreement” be-
tween the major generators and the CIC. The major generators 
are Nebraska Public Power Districts, and Omaha Public Power 
District in Nebraska, Wolfcreek Nuclear Operating Corporation 
in Kansas, Arkansas Power and Light Co. in Arkansas, and Gulf 
States Utilities Co. and Louisiana Power and Light Co. in Louisi-
ana. The first two are owned and operated by government, while 
the latter four are private corporations. The nuclear power plants 
in Arkansas and Louisiana are owned by Entergy Corporation. En-
tergy is one of the 250 largest corporations in the United States, op-
erates power generation facilities in several countries, and is cur-
rently negotiating to acquire the electric facilities from the British 
government. Entergy provides leadership among the major gen-
erators. The significant influence of the major generators is due to 
the fact that they provide the funds to the CIC so the CIC can pay 
AEC for the development of the facility. 
The Agreement is a loan agreement between the major gen-
erators and the CIC with a stipulation that interest on the loan 
is to accrue during the pre-operational phase and then be repaid 
during operations. During the latter period, principal and inter-
est is to be paid to AEC [cell (17,15)] which pays it to the CIC [cell 
(13,8)] which in turn, pays back the loan principal and interest 
to the major generators [cell (8,9)]. During the operational phase, 
both the major and minor generators of radioactive waste such as 
hospitals, research centers, and universities are to deliver waste 
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to the disposal facility in Boyd County [cells (9,17) and (10,17) 
respectively]. 
In addition to the Agreement, another organizing document in 
the network is the “Contract” between the CIC and AEC. Both or-
ganizations provide provisions and negotiations to the Contract 
[cells (8,11) and (13,11)] and both are governed by these negoti-
ated provisions [cells (11,8) and (11,13)]. The Contract establishes 
AEC as the developer and the CIC as the provider of funds that 
are obtained by the loan Agreement with the major generators. 
The funds are then sent to AEC, which in turn, sends most of them 
to Bechtel National Inc., the subcontractor. The importance of the 
major generators is also recognized in the Contract even though 
the generators are not a party to the Contract [cell (11,9)]. 
A major problem was created when the Contract established 
AEC as the developer rather than allow CIC to remain the devel-
oper and itself contracting with AEC to perform particular func-
tions as determined by the CIC. Consequently the CIC is left with-
out research and planning functions, and administrative control. 
Instead, AEC, the corporation that the CIC hired, determines what 
is to be accomplished and requests that the CIC give its approval 
and pay the invoices. Given the provisions of the Agreement and 
the Contract, the CIC has no alternative because the CIC does not 
have the millions of dollars to hire planners, engineering firms, 
test well drillers, monitors, and so forth to inspect and evaluate the 
developer’s work. 
A connection not recognized by the Contract is a connection to 
the Nebraska State agencies that have been granted authority to li-
cense and regulate the development and operation of the facility 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and by the Nebraska state 
government. The lead state regulatory agency is the Nebraska De-
partment of Environmental Quality (NDEQ). Since it is not a sig-
natory to the Contract, the Contract has established provisions 
that NDEQ has not approved, nor will approve, in the operational 
phase [cell (15,17)]. This arrangement has led to conflict and law-
suits, and will continue to do so in the future. 
An odd arrangement is the establishment of NDEQ as a subcon-
tractor to AEC. Thus, NDEQ is dependent on the corporation it is 
mandated to license and regulate for the funds necessary to under-
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take the licensing and regulation activities. NDEQ will continue to 
perform licensure and regulation functions during the operational 
phase [cell (5,17)]. In addition, NDEQ will regulate the volume 
rates that AEC can charge on waste deposited at the facility. 
The payments to NDEQ for reimbursable costs [cell (13,5)] that 
are provided by AEC, are also obtained from the major generators 
through the CIC. Included each year in the invoices from NDEQ 
to AEC is $100,000 for the Local Monitoring Committee (LMC) in 
Boyd County [cell (5,6)]. These funds are provided, according to 
legislation, so that the LMC can monitor all aspects of the system. 
Such monitoring activities have included research, data collection, 
advocacy, lawsuits, attendance at meetings, lobbying of legisla-
tion, and so forth. LMCs information is delivered to all organiza-
tions in the system. These informational deliveries are not shown 
in Figure 2 and 9.3 because the main interest here is the cost as-
pects of the system. 
The network recipient of the most funds is Bechtel National, 
Inc. Approximately 80 percent of the $81 million that has been 
expended to date on the project has gone to Bechtel, one of the 
world’s largest engineering services and construction corpora-
tions. According to Laton McCartney in Friends in High Places, 
Bechtel prefers a contractual arrangement whereby a smaller firm 
serves as the main contractor that actually signs the contract for 
development and construction, and Bechtel establishes a subcon-
tract with the smaller firm to do the work and receive most of the 
money. That is consistent with the arrangement Bechtel has in the 
CIC network. AEC, a small corporation in desperate financial con-
dition, has a “Technical Services Agreement” with Bechtel with the 
latter to do the planning, engineering design, and construction of 
the CIC facility. The Technical Services Agreement [11,14], is rec-
ognized by the Contract between AEC and the CIC. 
This SFM description clarifies that it is not possible to under-
stand any part of the system without knowing the contextual en-
vironment in which the system exists. While remaining cognizant 
of the surrounding network, the following sections will further re-
fine and elaborate particular parts of the system with a final goal 
of projecting costs of operating the facility. 
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Pre-operational Phase Expenses Without Construction Costs 
Although the main interest of this chapter is to model the costs 
during the thirty-year operational phase of the CIC facility, the 
network of the pre-operational phase costs are also visited because 
costs will be carried over to the operational phase from the activi-
ties of the pre-operational phase. The costs are to be amortized and 
repaid from disposal charges assessed on users of the storage facil-
ity during the operational phase. 
As defined in this section, the pre-operational phase of the CIC 
project includes all activities prior to the beginning of facility oper-
ation with the exception of facility construction (construction pay-
ments are not incurred until the operational phase). In preparation 
for planning discussions regarding future litigation and budgets, 
AEC presented a projected schedule of the licensing and develop-
ment process to the CIC. The projected date for commencement 
of operations, approximately January 2002, assumed that NDEQs 
schedule of license application evaluation is maintained and re-
sults in application approval (1997 Pre- construction Plan 2.0, 1996). 
Thus, the pre-operational phase is from 1987 through December 
2001. The SFM and accompanying digraph in Figures 9.4 and 9.5 are 
used to analyze contracts to determine cost functions. Although the 
SFM of Figure 4 is devoted to the pre- operational phase, the oper-
ational phase (row and column 20) is included as a component be-
cause it receives accumulated costs from the pre-operational phase 
as well as from the construction phase. The main contracts of con-
cern are the Contract between AEC and the CIC, and the Agreement 
between the major electric generators of the five states and the CIC. 
SFM of Contract between AEC and the CIC 
The Contract consists of the Contract itself, signed in 1987, and 
three subsequent amendments. Since it is the main determinant of 
costs and distribution of funds among parties of the CIC process, an 
in-depth analysis of the Contract is needed. But how? What kind? 
Attorneys analyze contracts for conformity to law. Contractors and 
subcontractors are only concerned about the costs they are allowed 
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Figure 4. Social fabric matrix of contracts and costs during CIC pre-opera-
tional phase
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Figure 5. Social matrix digraph network of contracts and costs during CIC 
pre-operational phase
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in the part of the contract directly affecting them. Economists sel-
dom read contracts; rather they do statistical studies on the ex-post 
financial flows. How do we get an ex-ante analysis of consequences? 
As is usually the case, the Contract’s text does not contain mathe-
matical or arithmetic expressions. Can we translate the textual pro-
visions into the mathematical expressions helpful for analysis? Al-
though such analysis has not been done before, a SFM analysis is 
completed in order to discover how different contract articles, sec-
tions, and terms define costs; what criteria are provided regarding 
cost criteria and requirements; and how the Contract defines the rel-
evant relationships among different parties. 
 The SFM requires researchers to move cell by cell and identify 
whether there are deliveries in the cells in order to provide an ex-
plication of those deliveries. In some cases, the conversion of cel-
lular information to a mathematical expression allows for more 
precision in explaining a particular delivery. To use the SFM, the 
Contract is thoroughly analyzed to discover the major criteria, re-
quirements, and institutions. As discovered, they are entered in 
the SFM as the row and column components. Then, the SFM is 
used to explain what each row component delivered to each col-
umn component as relevant to our problem area. 
Social belief criteria are expressed through the rules, regulations, 
and requirements of the Contract. These criteria are expressed in 
the matrix (Figure 4) as the sections in the Contract from whence 
they gain their legitimacy. For example, Article 4.01 in Figure 4 in-
dicates that the criterion is found in Article 4, Section 1, of the Con-
tract. The social institutions in Figure 4 are those recognized in the 
Contract. They include corporations such, as AEC and Bechtel, ac-
counting categories such as subcontractors’ costs, and so forth. In 
comparing Figure 4 with Figure 2, it becomes evident that the SFM 
components in Figure 4 are refined subdivisions of the Contract 
and Agreement components of the SFM in Figure 2. 
A complete SFM of the Contract and Agreement is not included 
in Figure 4 for a number of reasons. First, our main interest is in 
the operational phase. Second, receiving columns 1 through 9 are 
excluded because they demonstrate inter-contractual legal deliv-
eries not immediately pertinent to the cost analysis. Symbols A 
through F designate both the category of the contractor and the in-
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voice expenses of the same contractor. For example, A is the ex-
penses on the invoice of a sub-subcontractor A sent to Bechtel. The 
components and cellular information included are sufficient to ex-
plain how formulae (1), (2), and (3) below can be derived from the 
SFM. Figures 9.4 and 9.5 are limited to defining Bechtel’s part of 
the cost-plus formula. By explaining that part of the SFM, we learn 
how the cost-plus adder clauses build through the Contract pro-
cess to define formulae (1), (2) and (3). Cost categories G through 
N (see Table 1) are here excluded because the inclusion of cost cat-
egories A through F for Bechtel are sufficient for demonstrating 
how the analysis can be completed for contractual provisions. This 
is done through understanding the cellular deliveries as follows: 
Cell (1,10) Contract’s Delivery to A: The delivery of interest in cell 
(1,10) for defining costs is the coefficient delivered to sub-sub-
contractor A from the Contract. That coefficient is the coefficient 
that may be used to multiply costs before sending the invoice 
to Bechtel for reimbursement. A is the expenses of a sub-sub-
contractor whose contract with Bechtel does not allow for a cost 
plus adder, thus, the coefficient delivered in cell (1,10) is 1. 
Cell (2,11) Contract’s Delivery to B: The Contract terms in row 2 
of the SFM are delivered to B. B is the expenses of a sub-sub-
contractor who may add 10 percent to its cost before sending its 
invoice to Bechtel. Thus the coefficient delivered in cell (2,11) is 
(1 + .10). 
Cell (3,12) Contract and Technical Service Agreement’s Delivery 
to C: The CIC/AEC Contract and the Technical Service Agree-
ment between AEC and Bechtel join together to determine the 
relevant delivery in this cell. C is Bechtel’s own operating ex-
penses, exclusive of payroll expenses and capital equipment 
costs that are delivered internally to Bechtel. The Contract de-
livers a coefficient of (1 + .10), thus, the C expenses on the in-
voice can be increased by 10 percent. 
Cell (3,13) Contract and Technical Service Agreement’s Delivery 
to D: D is Bechtel’s home-office payroll expenses for the project. 
Due to contractual deliveries, they are increased by about 41.5 
percent, and in turn, 78 percent of that total is added for a coef-
ficient of (1 + .415) [1 + .78]. 
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Table 1. Cost-plus percentages that multiply CIC costs
Percentage  Definition of Terms
PV = 110% of A A is cost of sub-subcontractors without cost-plus 
contract
+ 121% of B  B is costs of sub-subcontractor with cost-plus con-
tract adder equal to 10%
+ 116% of C C is Bechtel’s operating expenses, exclusive of pay-
roll & capital costs
+ 291% of D  D is Bechtel’s home office payroll 
+ 233% of E  E is Bechtel’s non-home office payroll
+ 116% of F F is Bechtel’s capital equipment bought by CIC
+ G G is stipulated sum or unit cost contract awarded by 
Nebraska DEQ
+ (1 + a) of H  H is cost-plus contracts awarded by Nebraska DEQ
+ DEQ  DEQ is in-house costs of Nebraska DEQ
+ 105% of I  I is stipulated sum or unit-cost contract awarded by 
DEQ
+ 108% of J J is AEC’s operating expenses exclusive of payroll 
and equipment costs
+ 258% of K  K is AEC’s home office payroll 
+ 210% of L  L is AEC’s non-home office payroll
+ 108% of M M is AEC capital equipment bought by CIC
+ N N is lobbying and extraordinary legal expenses of 
AEC
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Cell (3,14) Contract and Technical Service Agreement’s De-
livery to E: E is Bechtel’s non-home office payroll expenses for 
wages and salaries. The contractual delivery is (1. + .415) [1 + 
.425] whereby E is increased by 41.5 percent, and that total is in-
creased by 42.5 percent. 
Cell (3,15) Contract and Technical Services Agreement’s Deliv-
ery to F: The coefficient delivered in Cell (3,15) is one which is to 
be applied to F. F is capital equipment that is bought by the sub-
contractor, Bechtel, who selects the equipment and owns it. 
Cells (10,16 and 11,16) Sub-subcontractors Deliveries to Bechtel: 
The sub-subcontractor’s expenses, multiplied by the contractual 
coefficients delivered to them (as explained above), are deliv-
ered as invoices to Bechtel. They are, therefore, A and B (1 + .10) 
when delivered. 
Cells (12,16), (13,16), (14,16), and (15,16) Bechtel’s Internal Cost 
Categories Deliveries to Bechtel: Bechtel’s own expenses are de-
livered to Bechtel with their coefficients as defined above. They 
are: C(1 + .10), [D(1 + .415)][1 + .78], [E(1 + .415)] [1 + .425], and 
F. 
Cell (3,16) Contract and Technical Service Agreement’s Deliv-
ery to Bechtel: Cell (3,16) provides the contractual authority for 
Bechtel to apply the coefficient (1 + .05) to invoices it receives 
from sub-subcontractors A and B, and (1 + .08) to its own inter-
nal expenses as they are bundled and presented with their own 
internal coefficients as presented in the cellular explanation just 
preceding this one. 
Cell (3,17) Contract and Technical Service Agreement’s Delivery 
to AEC: Cell (3,17) delivers to AEC the coefficients to apply to in-
voices received from subcontractors such as Bechtel. The nonfac-
tual authority is provided for AEC to multiply subcontractor’s 
invoices by (1 + .05) and to multiply its own expenses by (1 + 
.08). 
Cell (16,17) Bechtel Delivery to AEC: Given the authority ex-
plained above to utilize the contractually defined cost-plus co-
efficients, Bechtel sends an invoice to AEC as follows: {A + [B(1 
+ .10)]} {1 + .05} + [C(1 + .10)] + {[D(1 + .415)] [1 + .78] + [E(1 + 
.415)] [1 + .425]} {1 + .10} + F(1 + .10) 
The aggregating character of the Contract becomes clear with 
some very large cost-plus adders being authorized, often with-
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out a rational economic explanation. D, for example, is increased 
by 41.5 percent and that total increases by another 78 percent, as 
was explained above. That total, with adders, is increased again 
by 10 percent before sending the invoice to AEC. E is treated 
similarly. F is an equipment gift to Bechtel, ultimately paid for 
by the CIC. Bechtel selects the equipment, gets to own it, and in 
addition adds 10 percent onto the cost of the gift. 
Cell (3,18) Contract and Technical Services Agreement Delivery 
to the CIC: Cell (3,18) establishes the authority for the cost-plus 
invoices to be submitted to the CIC for reimbursement. 
Cell (17,18) AEC Delivery to the CIC: With regard to the Bechtel 
part of the cost-plus process, AEC takes the invoices sent form 
Bechtel, adds another 5 percent of that total, as provided in cell 
(3,16), and sends the total invoice to the CIC for reimbursement. 
Thus, the Bechtel part of the formula becomes: {{A + [B(1 + .10)]} 
{1 + .05}} {1 + .05} + [C(1 + .10)] [1 + .05] + {{[D(1+.415)] [1+.78] + 
[E(1 + .415)] [(1 + .425]} {1 + .10}} {1 + .05} + [F(1 + .10)] [1 + .05] 
As clarified in the discussion of cell (3,16), AEC may also add 
a 5 percent adder to the costs of other subcontractors as well as 
add an 8 percent adder to AECs own expenses. Therefore, the to-
tal invoice, PV, sent to the CIC is as found in formula (1). 
PV = {A + B(1 + .10)]} {1 + .05}} {1 + .05} + [C(1 + .10)] [1 + .05]  
+ {{D(1 + .415)] [1 + .78] + [E(1 + .415)] [1 + .425]} {1 + .10}}  
{1 + .05} + [F(1 +.10)] [1 +.05] + G + [H(1 + a)] + DEQ  
+ [I(1 + .08)] + {[J(1 + .365)] [1 + .75] + [K(1 + .365)]  
[1 + .425]} {1 + .08} + [L(1 + .08)] + M + N                                   (1)
PV stands for the present value of the invoices sent to the CIC. 
In addition to the Bechtel part of the formula contained in Figure 
4, all contractors, subcontractors and sub-subcontractors are in-
cluded (symbols G through N are defined in Table 1). When the 
formula is solved, the percentage coefficient for each term is as 
found in Table 1. 
Examples from Table 1 can be used to indicate why the costs 
of the project have become so exorbitant and why cost overruns 
have been common. For example, sub-subcontractors a not al-
lowed a cost-plus adder, yet their costs. A, invoiced to the CIC 
are 110 percent of costs because Bechtel and AEC are allowed 
to include their own percentage adders. Bechtel’s home office 
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payroll, D, is invoiced at 291 percent of cost, their non-home of-
fice payroll by 233 percent, and so forth. The information in for-
mula (1) and Table 1 also clarifies that all incentives are in the 
Contract are to increase cost functions without disincentives or 
penalties for increasing cost functions. The Bechtel part of for-
mula (1) has the highest cost adders and it is also the part that 
has received the most payments from the CIC, to date about 
80 percent of approximately $81 million. Table 2 is an example 
of how a $1,000,000 budget of direct costs becomes a budget of 
$2,269,850.63 when all adders, summing to $1,269,850.63, are 
added as defined by formula (1). 
Cells (6,18), (7,19), (8,18) and (8,19) Contract and Agreement De-
liveries to the CIC and Major Generators: The Agreement be-
tween the CIC and the major electric generators in the five states 
of the CIC establishes the authority for the major generators to 
provide the financing source for the projects expenses. This 
Agreement is also recognized in the Contract, giving AEC the 
authority to submit invoices and expect the financing from the 
major generators for the paying the invoices. The major gener-
ators agreed to finance the amount of the invoices submitted to 
the CIC from AEC. Thus, the costs are really being financed by 
the electric ratepayers. The interest rate delivered by the Agree-
ment to the major generators is the prime rate in the United 
States plus 6.5 percent. The financing is an accrued interest ar-
rangement whereby interest accumulates and the interest rate is 
applied to the accruing interest as well as to the principal. When 
the facility begins operations, the loan plus accrued interest will 
be amortized for repayment as part of the charges to those de-
positing radioactive waste at the facility. 
Cell (18,19) The CIC Delivery to Major Generators: Cell (18,19) 
is the delivery of notice from the CIC to the major electric gener-
ator to send a financial sum equal to the invoiced expenses that 
have been submitted from AEC for reimbursement. 
Cell (19,18) Major Generators Delivery to the CIC: The delivery 
in cell (19,18) is the delivery of loanable funds from the genera-
tors to the CIC to pay AEC’s invoices. 
Cells (19,17), (17,16), (16,11) and (16,10): Delivery of Payments to 
Pay Invoices of AEC, Bechtel, A and B: The cells are the mone-
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Table 2. Example of direct costs equal to $ 1,000,000 to demonstrate Bechtel 
part of formula
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tary payment flows for reimbursement of invoices as the money 
is loaned by the major generators to the CIC which pays AEC 
who pays Bechtel who pays sub-subcontractors. 
Cell (18,20) The CIC Delivery to Operational Phase: Cell (18,20) 
is the delivery of formula (2) to the facility operational phase of 
the CIC for amortization of the financing from the major genera-
tors. Formula (2) is as follows: 
                y
FV = ∑ PVj (1 + r + .065)y–1              (2) 
               j=1987 
FV is the future value of the financing from the major generators. 
The letter j indexes the year in which the PV on the invoice was 
paid; the first year being 1987. The letter y is the year to which 
the loan is being accumulated; the last year being 2001. PVj is the 
total value of major generator financing to pay costs in year j. 
The prime interest rate is r, and .065 is the interest rate added to 
the prime rate as specified in the Agreement. The estimated to-
tal owed to the major generators at the end of 1996 was approxi-
mately $120 million; this includes the amount of the loan and the 
accrued interest for the period 1987–1996 (Hayden and Snider, 
1996). The accumulation is not only significant but continues 
to grow exponentially. It will continue to grow in this fashion 
until the facility begins operation in January 2002. To find that 
amount, the total owed was projected forward, at the same rate 
as it has increased from 1987 through 1996, to December 2001. 
The total delivered in cell (18, 20) is to be amortized and paid in 
the operational phase. It is projected to be approximately $325 
million at the end of 2001. 
Cell (5,17) and (5,18), Contract Delivery to AEC and the CIC: Pro-
visions in the Contract between AEC and the CIC provide that in 
the initial period of the contract, a small part of project costs are 
financed by AEC. The Contract delivers those provisions in cells 
(5,17) and (5,18). From 1987 to 1992 that financing contribution 
amounted to about $6.2 million. 
Cell (17,20) AEC Delivery to Operational Phase: Between 1987 
and 1992 the contribution from AEC for financing pre-oper-
ational cost amounted to about $6.2 million. Both the CIC and 
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AEC have responsibilities in the collection of the loan plus ac-
crued interest in the operational phase of the facility. Together 
they deliver the results of formula (3), as follows: 
                                             y
     FVAEC = ∑ AECPVj (1 + .20)y–j                 (3)
                                        j = 1987 
where FVAEC is the future value of the financing from AEC to 
include accrued interest; j is the year in which AECPV was con-
tributed, first year being 1987; and y is the year to which the 
loan is being accumulated. AECPV is the total value of financ-
ing contributed to pay costs in year j, and .20 is the interest rate 
paid on AEC financing until January 1997. According to the 
CIC correspondence, the total of principal plus accrued inter-
est in December 1996 was $21,427, 401. Beginning in January 
1997, that amount has been carried forward using the new in-
terest rates for an expected amount to be owed to AEC in De-
cember 2001 equal to approximately $33.4 million. That amount 
is delivered to the operational phase for amortization and re-
payment from operational revenues. 
The SMF has provided a means to describe the general con-
text, to articulate particular socioeconomic components em-
bedded in that context, to define connections among the com-
ponents, and to convert cellular information to mathematical 
expression where appropriate. The analysis completed above 
allows us to see how the cost-plus formula builds through the 
Contract and Agreement to create a financial burden to be car-
ried forward to be amortized and paid during the operational 
phase. The total delivered to the operational phase is about 
$504.1 million. It includes the major generator financing ($325 
million), AEC financing contribution ($33.4 million), construc-
tion loan ($91.6 million), financial assurance loan ($41.5 mil-
lion) and AECs subsidiaries’ interest ($12.6 million). Major 
generator financing and AEC financing were explained above. 
The others will be explained below. In addition, the analysis 
above pinpoints the particular provisions in the Contract and 
Agreement that need to be renegotiated to reduce the financial 
burden. 
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Operational Phase 
According to Pre-construction Plan 2.0, developed for the 
CIC by AEC and Bechtel, the operational phase of the facility is 
planned to begin on January 2002, assuming the NDEQ licensing 
process is followed, and the license is granted. Again, the plan is 
for the facility to operate from 2002 to 2031. The purpose of this 
section is to estimate the allowable yearly costs during the oper-
ational phase in order to determine the consequent fee that waste 
generators will need to pay for waste storage. As explained ear-
lier, some costs accrued in the pre-operational phase are to be am-
ortized and paid during the operational phase. The cost of facility 
construction, which occurs the two years prior to operations com-
mencing, is also amortized to be paid by storage fees. Moreover, 
since $4.5 million in funds for re-mediation and possible early clo-
sure of the facility are to be in place the day operations begin, that 
amount is also to be borrowed. According to the SAR this loan of 
financial assurance funds will be amortized according to the same 
parameters as the construction loan. 
To discover the corporate/government network that processes 
these costs, a SFM of the institutions involved is constructed in Fig-
ure 6. Because the delivery of contractual provisions has already 
been explained and demonstrated in the pre-operational SFM of 
Figure 4, this SFM does not include the contractual criteria, rules, 
and requirements found in the Contract, Agreement, and SAR. 
The SFM will be reported, modeled and, analyzed with the assis-
tance of the system dynamics program, ithink. The SFM network 
digraph will be the system dynamics format of the ithink program. 
System Dynamics Network and Analysis 
System dynamics is an intellectual evolution from systems the-
ory (Hayden, 1989). Crucial to dynamic modeling is an under-
standing that the behavior of a system depends on its structure 
and the connections among the parts. A fundamental concept is 
that systems are structured so that the system provides for what 
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Figure 6. Social fabric matrix of institutional components during CIC opera-
tional phase
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is called feedback among the component parts. This means that 
one component influences another component, which influences 
another component, maybe in another part of the system, which 
in turn influences the original component (Radzicki and Sterman, 
1994). Such “feedback” patterns are emphasized in system dynam-
ics. “System dynamics models represent change as a function of 
the interplay between underlying patterns of positive- and neg-
ative-polarity feedback” (Gill 1996, p. 168). Negative feedback 
guides systems to stability and sustainability while positive feed-
back leads to growth and decay. 
 Several system dynamic programs have been developed. The 
authors, however, have found the modeling capabilities of ithink 
to be the most consistent with the theories and process concepts of 
the social sciences and institutional economics. In the explanation 
and diagrams below, circles are rules, regulations, requirements, 
or criteria—those expressions of social beliefs. The circles with 
“spigots” are the regulations, or regulators, that either regulate the 
level of deliveries between institutions or deliver regulations to in-
fluence other regulations. The rectangles are the SFM institutional 
components from Figure 6. The directed double lines represent the 
delivery flows among institutions, and the single-line directed arcs 
represent deliveries of rules, regulations, requirements, and crite-
ria for the regulation of flows among institutions. The cloud-look-
ing symbols are utilized to indicate that the source or destination 
of a delivery is not being explained by this model. (The symbols 
are in Appendix D). 
Operational Phase Network 
The analytic approach begins by presenting the highest level 
framework and proceeds to explanation and analysis of the partic-
ular sections which are the working parts of the whole. The high 
level, found in Figure 7 presents the main sections, or sectors, of 
the problem of concern. They are the Waste Generators, the CIC, 
AEC (divided between the production operation in Boyd County 
and the pecuniary operation of the corporation), subcontractors 
to the AEC, Boyd County Agencies, and Nebraska State Agencies. 
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Figure 7. High level mapping of CIC network structure
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The heavy lines in Figure 7 indicate the general flows among sec-
tors; the thinner lines represent deliveries of rules, regulations, or 
criteria. Articulation of the sectors will begin with an explanation 
of the radioactive waste stream delivered from the generators to 
the AEC facility. 
Waste Stream
As has been confirmed by numerous studies, the annual level 
of low- level radioactive waste continues to fall in the five-state re-
gion of the CIC and in the United States since 1980 (Coates, Heid, 
and Munger, 1994; Hoffman and Hayden, 1996; Chem-Nuclear, 
1997; and Fuchs, 1996). Figure 8 is a summary of the waste flow in 
Figure 8. Total radioactive waste/low ofCIC states 
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the CIC area since 1986. As is evident, total waste fell from a high 
in 1986 to a level of approximately 12,000 cubic feet in 1995. Sta-
tistical projections and technological assessments by nuclear en-
gineers and economists predict the waste stream to continue to 
decrease. 
The dramatic decrease in the waste stream is due to the devel-
opment of new processes and the application of new technology. 
The history of low-level waste generation and disposal is one of 
increasing public concern for safer storage and disposal. Recon-
structed, improved, and more secure facilities resulted in increased 
disposal fees  charged to waste generators. In turn, generators re-
sponded to the increased fees by finding new ways to decrease 
the volume of waste through innovations in production technol-
ogy and in compaction of waste generated (Jackson, 1996). As the 
volume of waste generated diminished, fewer units of waste were 
available over which to spread disposal facilities’ overhead costs. 
Consequently, unit costs increased, providing generators further 
incentive to reduce waste volume still more. As will be discussed 
below, the combination of declining waste volume, increasing fa-
cility costs, and the contractual requirement that disposal fees be 
sufficient to cover unit costs has resulted in estimated disposal fees 
for the CIC facility much higher than industry norms. Further-
more, the cycle of innovation creates a problem with regard to the 
SAR that assumed a constant annual 55,000 cubic feet stream of 
waste (see Figure 8). A review of the waste stream of 5,000 cubic 
feet per year is a sound assumption for modeling purposes, err-
ing on the side of adequacy. Thus, in Figure 9, the waste stream 
from the Waste Generators sector is 5,000 cubic feet per year. This 
reduction is waste volume calls for a reduction in the facility con-
struction scenario, as will be discussed below. 
Pre-operational Debt Owed to Major Generators 
As explained above, the total principal and interest that ac-
crued during the pre-operational phase to pay project expenses, 
is to be amortized and paid from waste stream charges. The ma-
jor generators have been financing the payments of non-construc-
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Figure 9. CIC operational cost network
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Figure 9. CIC operational cost network (continued)
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tion expenses during pre- operation with a cost-plus interest rate 
of prime plus 6.5 percent. The financing plus accrued interest will 
equal approximately $325 million at the end of 2001 and then be-
comes the new principle for amortization. It is delivered to the 
CIC, as demonstrated in Figure 9. It is delivered to the double-
lined rectangle labeled, Major Generators Amortization, interest 
since 1987 and will continue to receive such interest until opera-
tions begin in 2002. The interest rate was 20 percent until Decem-
ber 31,1996. At that date, the original principal of $6.2 million. 
 According to the Agreement, the loan is to be amortized at an 
interest rate of prime plus 6.5 percent. The prime rate for the past 
thirty years has averaged about 9 percent, thus, consistent with the 
SAR, 9 percent is used as the prime rate. The double-lined rectangle 
is used to indicate that a programming sub-model is being used to 
transform a delivery in some way. A sub-model, which is a transfor-
mation processing station, usually represents an institutional com-
ponent or components that have the responsibility and/or authority 
to apply the requisite rules, regulations, and their coefficients to the 
original delivery. The sub- model for the major generators financing 
is found in Appendix A. As is evident upon inspection, it is a stan-
dard amortization routine. In this case, it is utilized to determine the 
yearly payment to amortize the major generators* loan according to 
the requirements of the Agreement. (Subsequent amortization sub-
models are similar to the one presented in Appendix A.) 
After the transformation process, the information about the 
yearly payments is delivered as MG Payment Schedule (Figure 9). 
The regulator then delivers those instructions, by the arc, to the reg-
ulator on the P and I to MG flow. This informs AEC (Figure 9) about 
the size, of the payment to be made each year to amortize this debt. 
The loan of $325 million is amortized at a rate of 15.5 percent with 
level payments for thirty years using the amortization function from 
Appendix A. The annual payment to be collected for the loan is 
about $51 million. The flow lines from AEC charges and payments 
to the CIC Debt Fund and then from the CIC Debt Fund to the Ma-
jor Generators (Figure 9) indicate the yearly flow of the loan pay-
ment. The loan payment for each of the thirty years is found on row 
30 of Table 3 According to the Agreement, any year in which that 
payment is not made, the unpaid amount is added to the remaining 
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principle and the begins to accrue interest at prime plus 6.5 percent. 
AEC Contribution to Financing Pre-operational Expenses 
As explained above, a contribution was made by AEC for the 
financing of pre-operational expenses. This began in 1987 and 
reached the full contribution of $6.2 million in 1991. This amount 
has been accruing plus accrued compound interest had grown to 
$21.4 million. From January 1, 1997 until October 30, 1997, the in-
terest rate is to be prime plus 3 percent. From then until December 
31,2001 the interest rate is to be equal to prime. The total that will 
be owed to AEC on January 1, 1997 will be approximately $33.4 
million. According to the third amendment to the Contract, that 
amount is to be delivered to the operational phase, amortized, and 
repaid from surcharges on the disposal fees. As demonstrated in 
Figure 9, the AEC financing total is delivered to the AEC Amor-
tization sub-model. The sub-model then delivers to the AEC Pay-
ment Schedule instructions to the P and I flow to AEC. The loan is 
amortized at an interest rate of prime plus 2 percent, or 11 percent, 
which results in level payments of $4.1 million for the thirty-year 
life of the facility (see Table 3, row 31). 
Construction Loan 
Construction is to be completed by Bechtel. The plan in the SAR 
was for the facility to be constructed in three phases. However, 
due to the decrease in the amount of waste generated in the re-
gion, the first construction phase is all that will be considered in 
our analysis. The construction phase to be completed during the 
two-year period prior to operations provides for sufficient capac-
ity. Its costs and the loan arrangement are determined according 
to the SAR, the 1997 Pre- construction Plan, and the Contract. The 
total includes a 5 percent adder paid to AEC for the construction 
work completed by Bechtel, and interest that accrues on the loan 
during construction. The total to be amortized is $91.6 million. 
Because of the destitute financial condition of AEC, it is as-
sumed that the funds for the construction loan will also come from 
the major generators. As was the case for the pre-operation loan, 
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Table 3. Total costs during operational phase, 2002 through 2031*
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the CIC will serve as a conduit; borrowing from the major gener-
ators and loaning to AEC. Consistent with other funds borrowed 
from the major generators, the interest rate is expected to be prime 
plus 6.5 percent, or 15.5 percent. The construction loan is delivered 
to the CIC via the Construction Loan sub-model in Figure 9 for 
amortization calculations. 
In addition to the construction loan being amortized over thirty 
years an adder of “an amount equal to two percent (2%) of the in-
terest portion of said payments . . .” (Contract; 3rd Amendment 9, 
(6.01) a.4) is to be paid to AEC. The sub-model delivers the instruc-
tions for the annual loan payment to the CIC and the 2 percent ad-
der to AEC (row 5, 33 and 34 of Table 3). 
As indicated in Figure 9, the debt created by the financial assur-
ance loan is delivered, via another amortization sub-model, to the 
CIC for collection. The FA Amortization sub-model (Appendix D) 
determines the yearly payments and delivers notice of that infor-
mation to AEC, in Figure 9, for repayment. The yearly payment is 
reported in row 35 of Table 3 as about $6.5 million. 
AECs General Interest Expenses 
AEC has reported in their  SEC 10-K Report that they are capi-
talizing interest expenses incurred by their corporation in general, 
as part of the development costs of their projects in Boyd County, 
Nebraska and Ward Valley, California. None of this interest was 
incurred for the CIC project in Boyd County because all costs have 
been reimbursed including land and equipment costs. Only one of 
AECs subsidiaries, US Ecology, is involved in the CIC project. The 
interest that is being capitalized on the Boyd County project is re-
lated to borrowing under the Company’s credit agreement with its 
bank lender in an attempt to keep AEC out of bankruptcy. AEC 
expects the capitalized interest, none of which was incurred for the 
Boyd County project, to be included in the rate base charged waste 
depositors as indicated in Figure 9. This General AEC Interest flow 
is delivered from outside the operational phase to the General In-
terest Amortization sub-model for calculation of the yearly pay-
ment. An average of the past two years was used as the expected 
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added capitalization for each of the years during 1997 through 
2001. One-half was allocated to Ward Valley and one-half to the 
CIC project. This made for a total of about $12.7 million that will 
accumulate through 2001. Since other AEC contributions to be re-
paid are amortized at prime plus 2 percent, that rate (11 percent) 
is used for determining the loan payment schedule. The payment 
schedule is then conveyed to the payment process as indicated in 
Figure 9. The annual payment is about $1.4 million, as reported in 
row 32 of Table 3. 
Operating Costs 
The costs explained above did not occur during the operational 
phase. Next, the costs that are to occur during the operational 
phase are discussed. 
Direct Costs: The direct operating costs, along with their total 
are listed in rows 2 through 13 in Table 2. They are taken directly 
from the SAR. The assumption of AEC, in the SAR is that direct 
costs will remain at the same level and mix throughout the thirty-
year period. Therefore, the only growth in those rows is a 4 per-
cent annual increase due to inflation. 
Of special interest is that the various direct-cost categories in-
clude equipment and small tools such as trucks, computers, office 
equipment, lab and calibration tools, and so forth. Therefore, this 
equipment is paid for in full when operating expenses are paid. 
The reason this is of special interest is because AEC is paid for this 
equipment a second time when AEC is paid an amount equal to 
the cost of small equipment according to what is called deprecia-
tion, as discussed below. 
Subcontracts: The subcontractor’s expenses during operation 
along with their total are found in rows 14 through 22 in Table 3, 
as reported in the SAR. The SAR explains that they are to be pro-
jected forward with an inflation rate of 4 percent. 
AEC Overhead: An overhead charge of 42.5 percent of salaries 
and benefits is made by AEC. The annual payment to AEC is equal 
to the amounts found in row 23 of Table 3. 
AEC adder of 10 Percent: AEC, according to the Contract, is to 
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receive a 10 percent adder (row 24, Table 3) applied to the total of 
direct costs, subcontractor costs, and overhead; equal to the total 
of row 13 plus row 22 plus row 23. 
As indicated in Figure 9, the total operating expenses are paid 
from charges on the waste stream and paid to AEC. These ex-
penses are reported in row 25 of Table 3. 
Second Payment for Equipment and Tools 
According to the Contract, AEC is to be paid an amount equal 
to a depreciation schedule as applied to the full cost of equipment 
and tools bought during operation. So, in addition to using the de-
preciation as a tax deduction, AEC will get paid that amount. That 
means AEC is getting paid twice for the equipment and tools. For 
example, if a $25,000 truck is bought, AEC gets paid $25,000 imme-
diately through reimbursement by the CIC. Then a five-year de-
preciation schedule is utilized as a means to get paid an additional 
$5,000 per year for five years, or $25,000. Moreover, AEC is al-
lowed to retain the sale price of the truck when sold after it is five 
years old and to deduct the value of depreciation on its tax return. 
The depreciation schedule utilized here assumes straight-line 
depreciation and a five-year useful life. The sub-model detailed 
to calculate the depreciation amount is shown in Appendix B. The 
delivery of the annual payment to AEC is indicated in Figure 9, 
and the total of this delivery is indicated in row 40 of Table 3. 
Nebraska State and Local Agencies 
As demonstrated in Figure 9, the facility is expected to generate 
funds for state and local agencies. One such fund is for community 
improvement in Boyd County, which is to paid to the CIC, which 
will, in turn, make equal payments to Boyd County. The total 
grows at 4 percent per year to cover inflation, as found in row 26 
of Table 3. Another fund is established to support the Local Mon-
itoring Committee (LMC). Its funding is a level $100,000, without 
adjustment for inflation (row 27 of Table 3). It is paid by AEC to 
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NDEQ, which in turn makes the payment to the LMC. Lastly, re-
imbursement of NDEQ expenses is represented as a delivery to 
Nebraska State Agencies. It is adjusted by 4 percent annually for 
inflation; (see row 28 of Table 3). 
Radiation Site Closure and Reclamation Fund and the Radiation 
Custodial Care Fund 
Nebraska law requires that funds be available for remedial, or 
corrective, action during the operational phase, and for site closure 
and stabilization after operations; a portion of these funds are ini-
tially front- loaded with monies from the financial assurance loan. 
The funds are collected as a surcharge on waste disposed at the fa-
cility. The Radiation Site Closure and Reclamation Fund (RSC&R 
Fund) provides for site closure, while the Radiation Custodial Care 
Fund (RCC Fund) provides for both remedial action and long-term 
institutional care. Because of the reduced waste stream, figures re-
ported in the SAR have been adjusted as discussed below. 
Radiation Site Closure and Reclamation Fund: To accommo-
date the lower waste stream, a smaller facility than originally pro-
posed will be sufficient. Therefore, a facility consistent with only 
the first phase of construction is assumed. The cost of closing a fa-
cility of this size, as estimated in the SAR, is accepted and then ad-
justed for inflation. This leaves about $60 million to be collected via 
waste volume charges in the first eleven years. Consistent with the 
plan proposed in the SAR, the $60 million is collected over years 
one through eleven of operations to satisfy the requirements of the 
RSC&R Fund. This is indicated in row 36 of Table 3. Consistent with 
state guidelines that these funds be “outside the licensee’s adminis-
trative control,” Figure 9 represents payments for this fund as being 
delivered to the sector labeled Nebraska State Agencies. 
Radiation Custodial Care Fund: The RCC Fund is adminis-
tered in two components; remedial action and institutional care. 
As presented in the SAR, the necessary funds for remedial action 
are to be collected during years eleven through thirty. For institu-
tional care, funds are collected in years one through ten. A portion 
of the financial assurance loan is targeted for the institutional care 
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component of the RCC Fund. Consequently, given adjustments for 
inflation, for the smaller facility size, and for the diminished waste 
stream, about $21.2 million is to be collected for institutional care, 
and about $18.4 million will be collected for remedial action. 
Table 3, rows 38 and 39, indicate the projected surcharges as 
required by Nebraska law. Similar to the delivery of the RSC&R 
Fund, Figure 9c represents the RCC Fund payments as a delivery 
from AEC to the Nebraska State Agencies, consistent with NDEQ 
guidelines. 
The CIC Administrative Expenses 
The Contract provides that the CIC Commission may obtain 
funds from a surcharge to be levied on the users of the facility in 
order to pay the expenses of the Commission’s administration of 
the Compact. Such charges have been represented in Figure 9. The 
administrative costs in 1996 were more than $700,000. For calcula-
tions here, however, $700,000 has been projected forward at an an-
nual inflation rate of 4 percent. The payment amount is indicated 
in row 41 of Table 3. 
Related AEC Benefits 
Although not explicit in Figure 9, given the structure of the 
Contract, AEC can make a profit without the project being finan-
cially viable. AEC gets paid the adder equal to 2 percent of the in-
terest owed on the construction loan, the adder of 10 percent of 
operating expenses, and gets paid twice for equipment and tools 
purchased. They can benefit as long as the major generators are 
willing to continue to finance losses even if there is no inflow of 
waste. The provisions of the Contract do not require that the facil-
ity have a positive cash flow before AEC can make a gain. 
Other related benefits indicated in Figure 9 are as follows: the 
assets of AEC have been increased as the CIC pays for the land, 
equipment, and facility development and AEC takes ownership of 
the same. AEC has not had to pay interest on the asset gain. AEC, 
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therefore, is receiving an implicit interest benefit. Since the facility 
has been given to AEC, it can be depreciated for tax deductions. 
The land value, according to AEC’s SEC report, will be depleted 
for tax purposes Finally, the salvage value of equipment and other 
miscellaneous sales such as the hay crop, are also benefits to AEC. 
In addition, the Contract allows AEC any other income they might 
be able to get through the rate-making process. The provisions of 
the Contract do not require AECs gains be reduced if the facility is 
not financially successful. 
Financial Death Cycle 
As indicated in Figure 9, the Rate Setting Process sub-model 
(Appendix C) connects the payments to be made with the waste 
stream upon which the volume charges are to be assessed. The 
Contract provides that the disposal price is to be determined by 
dividing the costs by the amount of waste deposited at the facility. 
The results from those calculations are found in row 45 of Table 3. 
The charges necessary to cover contractual costs are greater than 
$18,500 per cubic foot for every year. In comparison, Coates et al. 
found that for the compact system to work, charges could not be 
more than $250 per cubic foot of waste (Coates, Heid and Munger, 
1994). For private sector comparisons, Envirocare of Utah charges 
about $125 per cubic foot for the lower spectrum of low-level ra-
dioactive waste. Chem-Nuclear Systems of South Carolina charges 
about $340 for the full range of low-level radioactive waste. The 
Central Midwest Compact, made up of Illinois and Kentucky, es-
timated their expected operational costs to be $600 per cubic foot 
and consequently decided the project was not financially viable. 
Thus, the estimated rates for the Boyd County facility indicate a 
death cycle—a financial death cycle. 
The system is in a financial death cycle according to a two sce-
narios. The first is the economic character of demand, and the sec-
ond concerns the exponential growth rate on unpaid loans. Knowl-
edge of demand curves informs us that as prices are increased to 
try to cover exorbitant costs, the quantity of the good or service de-
manded decreases. If the decrease in quantity demanded is sub-
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stantial relative to the increase in price, then revenues decline. This 
is the case for monopolies because the elasticity of demand for mo-
nopolies is greater than unity for the relevant range of operation. 
The AEC facility in Boyd County is a monopoly low-level ra-
dioactive waste facility. Given the cost situation that has been cre-
ated by the CIC, the unit price on waste deposited at the facil-
ity must be extremely high. This causes total revenue to fall, thus 
causing prices to be increased as required by the Contract, thus, 
causing revenues to fall further, and so forth. The facility, as in-
dicated by the cost data in Table 3, is too expensive for use. To at-
tempt to cover costs by raising disposal prices further contributes 
to a financial death cycle. 
The second way in which the death cycle is manifested is through 
the expansion of costs as amortized loans are unpaid. Since the unit 
disposal price is too high to call forth sufficient revenues to cover 
costs, it will not be possible to meet scheduled principal and interest 
payments on loans. The unpaid portion will then be refinanced at 
the high interest that will further increase the payments to be made. 
However, this merely adds to the payment amount, previously not 
payable due to insufficient revenue. The debt continues to grow, 
contributing to the conditions of a financial death cycle. 
Concluding Remarks 
This SFM analysis has allowed us to observe the working of a 
corporate/government network, to confirm the validity of some 
well- known system principles, to discover new principles in a sys-
tem network, to model operational costs of a particular case with the 
assistance of the system dynamics program ithink, and to thereby 
discover a financial death cycle that resulted when analysis and de-
mocracy have been excluded from policy and decision making. 
One of the most important principles confirmed is the conse-
quence of continuous circular cumulative causation whereby the 
feedback cycles of a system continue to reinforce each other, pro-
pelling a system farther and farther along a particular path as ex-
plained by Nobel prize economist, Gunmar Myrdal. When a 
system begins to deteriorate, the forces that are creating the de-
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terioration continue to re-circulate and accumulate greater and 
greater capacity for destruction. This happens because system pro-
vide feedback among the component parts such that any impact 
on a system which is inconsistent with the welfare of the system 
becomes magnified through the feedback process. 
The CIC project is a refulgent example of the principle of con-
tinuous circular cumulative causation. Its basic contractual struc-
ture is designed to reinforce destructive characteristics. There are 
positive incentives to create high costs; to the high costs are added 
high cost-plus adders, to which high interest rates are then ap-
plied. All of these high costs require high waste-volume charges 
which will decrease use of the facility, which will then lead to ac-
cumulated high unpaid costs, which circle back through the sys-
tem to make waste-volume charges increase further. This has con-
tinued to the point that the CIC project is not financially whole. 
Closely related to continuous circular cumulative causation, 
and also confirmed, is the principle that positive feedback leads to 
growth and decay, while negative feedback is necessary for stabil-
ity and sustainability. In the case studied here, the positive cost-
plus incentives and interest adders encourage that energies and re-
sources continue to be devoted to increasing costs, to the point the 
system is not financially viability. Negative incentives to encour-
age the reduction of cost functions, and penalties if performance 
milestones are not reached, are necessary to build a financial pro-
cess that is sustainable, but are here absent. 
The analysis of this corporate/government network confirms 
and magnifies the finding Henry Maine made late in the last cen-
tury when he stated that the base of society had evolved from sta-
tus to contract. The contractual element has grown in importance, 
and the battles over contractual form have a great influence on the 
working of the modern business and industrial process. 
This study presents a new way to analyze the legal contracts 
that guide a system, a way that allows for connections to be made 
between contract provisions and the consequential flows and de-
liveries. Such an analysis becomes increasingly important as in-
terest grows in monitoring costs of government contracts. Re-
fined studies that uncover the direct and indirect consequences 
of particular contractual provisions can be made with the SFM 
analysis as was demonstrated with the analysis of the CIC pre-
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operational phase. Analyzing contracts is like eating bear meat—
the more you chew the bigger it gets. Thus, an improved method 
for the analysis of contracts is a welcome addition to the social 
science tool kit. 
We have also seen that social beliefs are not vague abstractions, 
but are criteria embedded in rules, regulations, requirements, as 
expressed and enforced in contractual obligations. Moreover, be-
liefs are divided and developed among a whole array of institu-
tions and organizations, and refined by the institutional process 
throughout the network. 
Policy scientists cannot determine efficiency criteria until so-
cial beliefs are known. This leads to the instrumentalist ques-
tion: which belief components are appropriate to use in determin-
ing efficiency? In turn, this leads to the issue of social conflict and 
power. John R. Commons emphasized that the real social beliefs of 
a system are those that are enforced. This, he emphasized, deter-
mines reasonable value. His conclusion, is inadequate for a num-
ber of reasons. First, he was really stating, tautologically, that what 
exists is best. Second, in the case analyzed above, the enforced be-
lief components led, not to reasonable consequences, but rather to 
a financial death cycle. Third, his prescription can be interpreted 
to mean that who ever has the power to establish and enforce the 
rules, regulations and requirements should be considered as en-
forcing efficiency and reasonable value. Such a prescription cannot 
be endorsed by instrumentalists. Those who have the power may 
enforce a system that is quite inconsistent with general social be-
liefs. Therefore, policy scientists can not avoid the issue of power 
and social conflict when evaluating for efficiency. 
The system analyzed above functions the way it does because 
particular groups had the power to establish and enforce partic-
ular social rules and requirements that led to socially undesirable 
consequences. For example, when the two-to-three hundred per-
cent cost-plus adders were established and enforced in the pre-op-
eration phase Contract formulae, the operational phase was pre-
destined for failure. The positive feedback was established within 
a swirl of social conflict manifested through political and judicial 
battles. The SFM analysis of networks allows for the tracing of con-
nections between system components and system consequences. 
This allows for instrumental decisions about system efficiency. It 
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also allows for the observation of socioeconomic power at work.
Policy studies have generated numerous hypotheses about so-
cial conflict, especially with respect to alliances among corporate 
interests and government. But such hypothesis are seldom mod-
eled or explained with real-world examples. The SFM and ithink 
analysis allows for explicit modeling of a real world example and 
generates information about how those with power alliances have 
established a real-world network. 
In addition, the computer model developed for this case can 
be utilized for future analysis and deliberations. It allows for the 
determination of impacts throughout the system to be measured 
when particular changes are contemplated. Thus, the impacts of 
alternative provisions in the Contract and the Agreement can be 
traced throughout the model. New sectors and new concerns can 
be added. For example, new engineering designs can also be used 
to help discover the systems that are viable. 
References 
Antonucci, G. 1997. Pre-requisites for a Stable Disposal Future at Barn-
well. Presented to the Low-Level Waste Forum. Chem-Nuclear 
System. 
Arnold, T. 1937. The Folklore of Capitalism. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. 
Coates, D., V. Heid, and M. Munger 1994. “Not Equitable, Not Ef-
ficient: US Policy on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 13, No. 3, 526–538. 
Fuchs, R. L. 1996. State-by-State Assessment of Low Level Radioac-
tive Waste Received at Communal Disposal Sites. DOE/LLW-237. 
Washington, DC: US Department of Energy. 
Groenewegen, J. and P. Beije 1989. “The French Communication 
Industry Defined and Analyzed Through the Social Fabric Ma-
trix, the Filière Approach, and Network Analysis,” Journal of 
Economic Issues 23 (December 1989), 1059–1974. 
Gill, R. 1996. “An Integrated Social Fabric Matrix/Systems Dy-
namics Approach to Policy Analysis,” System Dynamics Review 
co n t R ac t S an d co S tS i n a co R p o R ate/Go v e R n me n t Sy S tem 279
12 (Fall 1996), 167–249. 
Hayden, F. G. 1982. “Social Fabric Matrix: From Perspectives to 
Analytical Tool,” Journal of Economic Issues 16 (September 
1982), 637–661. 
——————— 1988. “Values Beliefs, and Attitudes in a Sociotechnical 
Setting,” Journal of Economic Issues, 22 (June 1988), 415–426. 
——————— 1989. Survey of Methodologies for Valuing Externalities and 
Public Goods. Washington DC: US Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
——————— 1996. “Report on the Financial Condition of American 
Ecology Corporation.” Lincoln, NE: Office of the Nebraska 
Commissioner, Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Compact. 
——————— 1998. “Normative Analysis of Instituted Processes.” In 
Institutional Theory and Applications: Essays in Honour of Paul 
Dale Bush, S. Fayazmanesh and M. R. Tool eds. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Hayden, F. G. and S. R. Bolduc 1997. “Political and Economic 
Analysis of Low-Level Radioactive Waste,” Journal of Economic 
Issues 31 (June 1997), 605–613. 
Hoffman, D. J. and F. G. Hayden 1996. “Waste Stream Analy-
sis of the Proposal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site in Boyd 
County, Nebraska.” Lincoln, NE: Office of the Nebraska Com-
missioner, Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Compact. 
Jackson, S. A. 1997. LLWnotes. Washington DC: Afton Associates 
Inc. 11, June. 
Kuzelka, R. 1996. “American Ecology Financial Information,” 
Memo to F. Gregory Hayden, Lincoln Nebraska: Central Inter-
state Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission, September. 
———————  1996. “US Ecology Equity Contribution Information,” 
Memo to F. Gregory Hayden, Lincoln Nebraska: Central Inter-
state Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission, November. 
Maine, H. S. 1861 (1986). Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early 
History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas. New York: 
F. G. Hay d en & S. R. Bo l d uc i n Ind us tr I a l Pol I c I es af t er 2000  (2000)280
Dorset Press. 
McCartney, L. 1988. Friends in High Places: The Most Secret Corpo-
ration and How It Engineered the World. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Meister, B. 1990. “Analysis of the Federal Farm Policy Using the 
Social Fabric Matrix,” Journal of Economic Issues 24 (March 
1990), 189–224. 
Melman, S. 1983. Profits Without Production. New York: Knopf. 
Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality. Title 194—Rules 
and Regulations for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste. 
Nebraska Department of Health. Title 180, Nebraska Admin-
istrative Code, Chapter 1—Regulations for the Control of 
Radiation. 
Radzizki, M. J. 1980. “Institutional Dynamics, Deterministic Chaos, 
and Self-Organization Systems,” Journal of Economic Issues 24 
(March 1980), 57–102. 
Radzizki, M. J. and J. D. Sterman 1994. “Evolutionary Economics 
and System Dynamics.” In Evolutionary Concepts in Contempo-
rary Economics, R. England ed.,Ann Arbor: University of Mich-
igan Press, 61–89. 
Safety Analysis Report (Rev. 8). License Application submitted 
by US Ecology to the Nebraska Department of Environmental 
Quality, Lincoln NE. 
Technical Service Agreement Between US, Inc. and Bechtel Na-
tional, Inc. For Engineering, Procurement, and Construction 
Management Services for the Central Interstate Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Disposal Facility. Lincoln, Nebraska: Office of 
US Ecology, Inc. 
co n t R ac t S an d co S tS i n a co R p o R ate/Go v e R n me n t Sy S tem 281
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Appendix B. Depreciation Payment on Equipment
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Appendix C. Rate Setting Process 
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Appendix D. Abbreviations and Symbols 
A through N  See Table 1
AEC  American Ecology Corporation
Agreement  Contractual agreement between CIC and the major   
     generators 
Bechtel  Bechtel National, hie.
CIC  Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact
Contract  Contractual agreement between CIC and AEC
FA  Financial assurance
GI  AEC general interest
ithink®  Name of system dynamics computer program
LMC  Local Monitoring Committee of Boyd County, Nebraska
MG  Major generators
NDEQ  Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality
RCC Fund  Radiation Custodial Care Fund
RCC&R Fund  Radiation Site Closure and Reclamation Fund
SAR  Safety Analysis Report
SEC  US Securities and Exchange Commission
SFM  Social Fabric Matrix
P and I  Principal and Interest
 
 Institution or organization
 Flow delivery
 Regulator on a flow delivery
 Rules, regulations, requirements, or criteria
Arc indicates delivery of rules, regulations, requirements,     
or criteria
Programming submodel, or a transformation process 
station
Source or destination of flow delivery not modeled in the 
system 
